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TAXI LESSEES ARE NOT EMPLOYEES
UNDER NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT:
D.C. CIRCUIT'S NEW CONCEPT
OF EMPLOYER CONTROL-
SEAFARERS LOCAL 777 V. NLRB
The National Labor Relations Act (the Act)' protects 2 only those involved
in an employment relationship. 3 Included in this relationship are
"employees" of "employers", as those terms are defined by the statute 4 and
case law. 5  The independent contractor 6 is- explicitly excluded 7 from the
definition of "employee." Consequently, persons having the status of inde-
pendent contractor cannot meaningfully organize 8 or collectively bargain 9
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1976). Passed in 1935 as the Wagner Act, Ch. 372. §§ 1-16, 49 Stat. 449
(1935), the National Labor Relations Act was amended in 1947 with passage of the Labor-
Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), and
again in 1959 by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73
Stat. 519 (1959). All references, unless otherwise indicated, are to the Act as amended.
2. Section 7 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976), guarantees to employees the right to
organize, collectively bargain with the employer, strike, and refrain from such activities. Under
section 8(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1976), any employer interference with the
employee's exercise of his § 7 rights is an unfair labor practice for which the employee can file a
charge against the employer before the National Labor Relations Board.
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(2)-(3) (1976).
4. Section 2(2) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976), does not expressly define "employer"
but explicitly excludes public employers, employers covered by the Railway Labor Act, 45
U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1976), and labor organizations.
"Employee" is not explicitly defined except that it includes anyone who has been fired as a
consequence of a labor dispute or unfair labor practice. Specifically excluded are agricultural
workers, domestic servants, persons employed by a parent or spouse, independent contractors,
and supervisors. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976).
5. The cases define "employee" and "employer" according to the common law definition.
See, e.g., NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968); NLRB v. Int'l Long-Shoreman's and
Warehouseman's Union Local 10, 283 F.2d 558, 563 (9th Cir. 1960). Under the common law
definition, an employment relationship exists when the employer exercises control over or has
the right to control the manner and means of how the work is performed. RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1958).
6. An independent contractor is delined as a "person who contracts with another to do
something for him but who is not controlled by the other with respect to the physical conduct
in the performance of the undertaking." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1958).
7. The explicit exclusion was added by the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley
Act), Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
8. Independent contractors can and often do organize into self-regulatory trade associa-
tions. When referring to "organizing," this Note contemplates the forming of a labor union as
defined by § 2(5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1976).
9. Independent contractors who join together to negotiate terms and conditions of work
can be held to be illegally restraining commerce under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-7, as amended by the Clayton Act, Pub L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914). See Mitchell v.
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with the employer. A device available to employers attempting to prevent
the unionization of its workers is to assert an independent contractor status
of those workers.10 If the employer shows that the only concern is with the
result of the labor of the worker hired, and that the employer lacks the right
to control the manner or means by which that result is achieved, the
employer has established that the workers are independent contractors and
cannot organize under the Act."
The taxi driver is particularly vulnerable to this common tactic of labor
warfare, since the work requires that the individual be free to prospect for
fares in the manner in which he or she chooses, 1 2 and the employer is con-
cerned mainly with his or her returning a certain profit to the company,
rather than how that profit is obtained. The National Labor Relations Board
(the Board), 13 however, has traditionally considered the nature of the work
Gibbons, 172 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1949). See also Note, Woodcutters: Employees or Independent
Contractors, 31 GUILD PAnC. 9 (1973). Such combinations for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing by employees, however, are statutorily exempt from the antitrust laws. 15 U.S.C. § 17
(1976). Labor collective bargaining is defined in § 8(d) of National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976), as the "performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the
representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. . . ." See J. JENKINS,
LABOR LAw § 9.5 (1969). See also R. GORMAN, LABOR LAw 399-401 (1976) [hereinafter re-
ferred to as GORMAN].
10. There are three situations where the workers' independent contractor status is generally
raised: (1) When a union, attempting to organize the employer's workers, petitions for a rep-
resentation election (see note 17 infra) under § 9(c) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1976), the peti-
tion will be dismissed if the employer can show that the workers are independent contractors.
See, e.g., Trade Wind Transportation Co., Ltd., 185 N.L.R.B. 373, 373 (1970); Vaughn, d/b/a
Vaughn Bros., 94 N.L.R.B. 382, 383 (1951). (2) Employers charged with the commission of unfair
labor practices (see note 2 supra) often assert a defense that the victim of the alleged unfair
labor practice is an independent contractor and consequently outside the protection of the Act.
See, e.g., Musicians, Local 360, 170 N.L.R.B. 271, 271 (1968); Crow Gravel Co., 168 N.L.R.B.
1040, 1040 (1967); Maxwell Co., 164 N.L.R.B. 713, 715 (1967), enf. den. on other grounds, 414
F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1969). (3) When a union pressures an employer to cease doing business with
another party until that party joins the union, the union is in violation of § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(4), or § 8(e) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (e), if the party is an independent contractor
rather than an employee hired by the employer. See, e.g., Local 814, IBT (Santini Bros.), 223
N.L.R.B. 752 (1975), enforced, 546, F.2d 989 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
11. E.g., Twin City Freight, Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 1219, 1220 (1975). This is the common law
test which the courts and the Board use to determine the status of a worker under the Act. See
note 5 supra.
12. Generally a cab company has little actual control over the physical movements of the
driver while he is operating the cab. The only direct method of controlling the driver is by
radio dispatch or by requiring the driver to periodically report to a check spot.
13. The Board is a 5-member commission charged with enforcement of the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1976). Its functions are to review hearings designed to
determine if any employer or a union is guilty of unfair labor practices, see note 2 supra, and to
conduct representation elections. See note 18 infra. GORMAN, supra note 9, at 7.
The structure of the Board has changed somewhat since its inception in 1935. Under the
Wagner Act, ch. 372, § 3(a), 49 Stat. 449 (1935), the Board was to be composed of three members
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in determining the extent of the employer's control over the driver.1 4  The
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals recently rejected this practice.
In Local 777, Democratic Union Organizing Committee v. NLRB (Seafarers,
Local 777),15 a case arising out of the latest chapter in the noteworthy his-
tory of the Chicago taxicab industry, 16 the court found that the taxi drivers
who lease cabs from companies are independent contractors rather than
employees.17
This Note will trace the historical development of the employee-
independent contractor distinction under the Act. It will compare the re-
strictive test for making this distinction with the more flexible test that the
Board has applied in taxi leasing cases. This Note will then illustrate how the
court in Seafarers, Local 777 rejected the Board's approach and promulgated
a restrictive test for determining the status of taxi lessees. Finally, it will
examine whether the test adopted by the court will enhance the ability of
employers in the taxi business, and in similiar industries, to use leasing as a
union-busting tactic.
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Its function was to "supervise the
election process from the filing of a petition to the certification of the election results, as well as
processing unfair labor practice charges through investigation, prosecution and adjudication."
GORMAN, supra note 9, at 7. The Taft-Hartley Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947),
expanded the Board to five members and gave the President exclusive power of appointment.
In addition, the Board was allowed to delegate its investigatory, prosecutory and adjudicatory
functions to regional offices throughout the United States. The Board now sits mainly as a
reviewing body for decisions from representation and unfair labor practice hearings, which are
presided over by administrative law judges. See note 33 infra. These decisions may be reviewed
by the entire Board or by a three-member panel of Board members. See § 3(b) of the Act, 29
U.S.C. § 153(b) (1976).
14. See, e.g., Columbus Green Cabs, Inc. II, 237 N.L.R.B. No. 176, 99 L.R.R.M. 1181,
[1978] 4 LAB. L. REP. (85 Lab. Cas.) 15,014 (1978); Yellow Cab Co., 229 N.L.R.B. 1329. 1333
(1977), enf. denied sub nom. Local 777, Seafarers, Democatic Union Organizing Comm. v.
N.L.R.B., 99 L.R.R.M. 2903, 84 Lab. Cas. 10,865 (1978); Checker Cab Assoc., Inc., 185
N.L.R.B. 182, 184 (1970); Trade Wind Transp. Co., 185 N.L.R.B. 373, 373 (1970).
15. 99 L.R.R.M. 2903. 84 Lab. Cas. 10,865 (D.C. Cir. 1978), decided by Judges Tamm,
Mackinnon, and Markey.
16. The Chicago taxicab industry has been marred throughout its history by violence, legal
dispute, and political scandal. From the violent war over its control in the 1920's to a political
scandal in the 1970's, in which Chicago Consumer Commissioner Jane Byrne implicated
Chicago Mayor Michael Bilandic, the Chicago cab companies have been a center of controversy.
For an investigation of the Chicago cab industry see McGrath, Behind the Yellow Door, Chicago
Magazine, January, 1978, at 97. See also Kitch, Isaacson & Kasper, The Regulation of Taxicabs
in Chicago, 14 J.L. & ECON. 285, 316-43 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Kitch].
17. 99 L.R.R.M. at 2916. This was the major issue decided in the case, however, two other
questions were at issue. The first was whether the company's unilateral imposition of a $10.00
fee for drivers taking cabs home overnight was an unfair labor practice. The second was whether
the decision to lease cabs was a mandatory subject of bargaining. This Note will address these
issues only where they are germane to the major issue of whether taxi lessees are independent
contractors or employees under the Act.
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THE FACTUAL SETTING
Local 777 of the International Seafarers Union was certified 18 in 1961 19 as
bargaining representative for all taxi drivers of Yellow and Checker Cab
Companies 20 in Chicago. At the time of certification, all taxi drivers in-
cluded in the bargaining unit 21 were paid on a commission basis. Under this
commission program, each driver returned a percentage of his total daily
fares to the company, the driver's compensation consisting of the unreturned
portion of the fares and any tips. The percentage of the driver's fares that
the company was entitled to was determined by a rate schedule established
in the collective bargaining agreements 22 between the union and the com-
pany. 23
18. The Board will certify a union as the bargaining representative for a unit of employees
when chosen by a majority of those employees in an election. When a petition requesting an
election is filed, either by a union or by management pursuant to § 9(c) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(c) (1976), the Board, through a Regional Director, investigates to determine if the
employees are sufficiently interested in having an election. Interest in an election is usually
established by a showing that 30% of the workers involved want union representation, as re-
flected by authorization cards which are signed by the worker and indicate this desire. Once
interest is established, the Board defines the appropriate unit of workers for the union to repre-
sent. The Board will then conduct the election. See GORMAN, supra note 9, at 40-43. See
generally Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 38 (1964).
19. Checker Taxi Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 611 (1961).
20. Yellow Cab Company is a wholly owned subsidiary of Checker Cab Company. Together
Yellow and Checker own all but 934 of the 4600 licenses to drive a cab issued by the City of
Chicago. Kitch, supra note 16, at 286.
21. Included in the appropriate bargaining unit were all Checker and Yellow garage
employees and chauffers (drivers). Only the chauffers were involved in the instant case. Yellow
Cab Co., 229 N.L.R.B. 1329, 1341 (1977).
22. The percentage return to the company varied between 45% and 50% of the total fares
collected; the exact amount depended on the seniority of the driver. Kitch, supra note 16, at
293.
23. In addition to establishing the rate schedule, the agreement dealt with other terms and
conditions of employment, such as working hours, procedures and grounds for layoff or suspen-
sion, a pension plan, and vacations. The contract covered various aspects of the employment
relationship. The companies established a lengthy job application procedure designed to assure
the reliability and honesty of drivers by investigation of the background of the driver-applicant.
Once hired, a driver was issued a rule book. The rule book governed the employment relation-
ship and contained such requirements as regular attendance, promptness of drivers, and obedi-
ence to supervisors. In addition, the rule book imposed restrictions on the method in which the
cab was operated. These restrictions included instructions not to use the cab to push other cars,
not to eat during the rush hour, not to use personal radios in the cab, and not to smoke while
carrying customers. It also required drivers to assist passengers with luggage, to call out the
customer's destination, to remind passengers about seat belts, to remain until unescorted
women or children are safely inside at night, and to keep a trip sheet. (A trip sheet is used by
the driver to record every customer he or she carries in a given shift. It shows the distance
traveled, the number of customers carried during a trip, and the fare collected. The purpose of
the trip sheet is to determine how much the driver collects during the shift so that the company
can exact its share.) Yellow Cab Co., 229 N.L.R.B. at 1341.
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The commission basis was initially the only method of operation used by
the companies. In 1974, claiming a substantial reduction in earnings 24 and
difficulty in getting full time drivers, 25 the companies developed a plan to
begin leasing taxicabs. Over the union's protest, 28 the leasing program was
implemented in 1975. Under this program, taxicabs were leased to drivers
on a twelve 2 7 or twenty-four hour basis. The driver paid a flat rental fee,28
keeping all fares and tips collected while using the cab. The rights and obliga-
tions of the lessee-driver and lessor-company were defined by a lease agree-
ment which specifically provided that the lessee-driver was an indepen-
dent contractor rather than an employee of the lessor. The lease agreement
also contained provisions giving the cab company the right to renew or ex-
tend a lease at will, prohibiting subleasing by the lessee-driver, 29 and re-
quiring the driver's compliance with city regulations concerning the use and
operation of taxicabs. 30
The contract also required the drivers to comply with all company rules under threat of
discharge or discipline. It required driver compliance with all municipal regulations governing
the operation of taxicabs in Chicago. Because of the City of Chicago's extensive regulation of its
taxicab industry, see Kitch, supra note 16, pursuant to Chicago Municipal Code ch. 28-1
(1974), there was a great deal of overlap between the company rules and the city regulations.
See note 30 infra.
24. At the end of 1973, Yellow was operating at a loss while Checker was operating at a
slight profit. Yellow Cab Co., 229 N.L.R.B. at 1343.
25. Id. A deficiency in full-time drivers has been a constant problem for the cab companies.
Kitch, supra note 16, at 296.
26. Immediately prior to the implementation of the leasing program, then Union President
Clark announced at a Chicago Federation of Labor meeting that the union was opposed to
leasing, that the cab companies were engaging in union-busting activities, and that the drivers
might strike in retaliation. The union again voiced its feelings at negotiations which were in-
tended to deal with the leasing operation. See note 31 infra. At these negotiations, the union
demanded to be recognized as the bargaining agent for the lessee drivers. Moreover, when a
union attorney was asked if he had any proposals to discuss, his response was, "Yes, I have. Get
out of the leasing business." Yellow Cab Co., 229 N.L.R.B. at 1344.
27. There were two types of twelve-hour leases: a day lease which ran from 6:00 A.M. to
6:00 P.M., and a night lease which ran from 6:00 P.M. to 6:00 A.M. Id. at 1346.
28. When the leasing program began, Yellow charged $22.00 for a day lease, $15.00 for a
night lease, and $31.00 for a 24-hour lease. Id. By October of 1978, the fees had been hiked to
$27.00 for a day lease, $23.00 for a night lease, and $36.00 for a 24-hour lease. Chicago
Tribune, Oct. 25, 1978, at 3, col. 4.
29. One of the lease restrictions designed to prevent sub-leasing was that lessees could not
drive more than 250-miles per shift. Yellow Cab Co., 229 N.L.R.B. at 1347.
30. Like most major cities, Chicago extensively regulates its taxicab industry. As the ad-
ministrative law judge (see note 33 infra) noticed, "the rules and regulations promulgated by the
Commissioner [of Consumer Sales, Weights, and Measures, the official charged with taxicab
regulation in Chicago] pursuant to the code impose intensive and detailed controls upon the
taxicab business, including licensee and driver, which cover virtually every aspect of that busi-
ness." Id. at 1340.
An owner of a cab must first get a license from the city to operate a cab in Chicago.
CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE, § 4 (1974). Once licensed, the owner and anyone the
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In a series of negotiations between the union and the cab companies
concerning the leasing program, the union demanded recognition as the
bargaining representative for the lessee-drivers.31 When the companies re-
fused, the union filed a charge with the Board contending that the com-
panies were violating their statutory duty to bargain.32  In a hearing to de-
termine the substance of the charge, the administrative law judge 3 found
no violation, relying on his finding that the lessee-drivers were independent
contractors. Consequently, it was held that the company's duty to bargain
with the union did not extend to these drivers. 34 The Board, however, re-
owner hires to drive the cab must comply with all city regulations dealing with the operation of
cabs. For example, a driver must obtain a chauffeur's license to drive a cab. This entails a
complete physical examination and subjection to a police investigation of the character of the
driver. Every driver must comply with the regulations governing rates of fare, use of the meter,
and service to O'Hare Airport. Id. at § 8. He or she must be courteous to customers, present a
neat appearance, and keep the cab clean. He or she cannot refuse service to customers. In
addition, every driver must keep the cab in operation while in possession of the cab. Id. at § 9.
Consequently, if a driver wanted to use the cab to "spend his days at the racetrack," he would
be in violation of the code. Yellow Cab Co. 229 N.L.R.B. at 1340.
A driver could be fined, have his chauffeur's license revoked, or face criminal prosecution for
violating a city regulation. The cab company, in addition, can be held liable for all driver
infractions and could have its license to operate that cab revoked for driver violations. Id. See
generally Kitch, supra note 16; Verkuil, The Economic Regulation of Taxicabs, 24 RUTGERS L.
REV. 672 (1970) [hereinafter Verkuil].
31. Meetings between the union and the company were conducted on June 5 and 17, 1975.
The meetings consisted mainly of questions, accusations, and denials. Little actual negotiating
over the leasing program occurred. Despite the failure to meaningfully negotiate the implemen-
tation of the leasing program, the companies began leasing on July 1, 1975. Yellow Cab Co.,
229 N.L.R.B. at 1344.
32. Under § 8(a)(5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976), it is an unfair labor practice for
an employer to refuse to bargain with a union designated as a representative of its employees.
The union's theory was that the company's unilateral imposition of the leasing program without
actually negotiating with the union at the June meetings constituted a refusal to bargain under
§ 8(a)(5).
33. [Hereinafter referred to as the ALJ]. The ALJ presides over the hearing at which it is
initially determined whether a party is guilty of an unfair labor practice. After the hearing is
completed, the ALJ decides the case, writes a recommended decision, and sends the opinion to
the Board for review. See generally K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TEXT § 10.01 (3d ed.
1972). See also Segal, Administrative Law Judge, Thirty Years of Progress and the Road Ahead,
62 A.B.A.J. 1424 (1974).
34. Yellow Cab Co., 229 N.L.R.B. at 1352. While the ALJ found that the company did not
have to recognize the union as bargaining representative of the lessee drivers, since those
drivers were outside the scope of the Act, the company would still be under a duty to bargain
over the implementation of the leasing program if it was a "mandatory subject of bargaining."
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 210 (1964). The leasing program
would be a mandatory subject of bargaining if it might have an effect on the terms and condi-
tions of the commission drivers' employment. Id.
The ALJ found that it was not a mandatory subject of bargaining since the union failed to
prove any adverse effect of the leasing program on commission drivers. The union, for example,
failed to show that the leasing program resulted in work being taken from commission drivers
and given to lessee drivers, or that the better cabs were given to the lessee drivers while
commission drivers got inferior cabs. Yellow Cab Co. 229 N.L.R.B. at 1352.
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fused to follow the administrative law judge's ruling and found the drivers to
be employees. 35
On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit Court, in a stinging rebuke of
the Board for its inconsistency in determining the status of taxi lessees,
3 6
refused to defer 37 to the Board's decision. In finding that the taxi lessees
35. Yellow Cab Co., 229 N.L.R.B. at 1333 (decided by Chairman Fanning and members
Jenkins, Murphy, and Pennello. Pennello dissenting). The Board also found that even if the
lessee drivers were independent contractors, the companies violated § 8(a)(5) of the Act. The
Board, relying on Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964), found that the
decision to lease cabs was a mandatory subject of bargaining. The Board reasoned that because
of the limited number of cab licenses issued to the companies, see note 20 supra, the leasing
operation would decrease the size of the union drivers' bargaining unit, thus reducing the un-
ion's bargaining power. This, the Board observed, would have an adverse effect on the terms
and conditions of the commission drivers' employment. 229 N.L.R.B. at 1333-34.
36. Referring to the Board's inconsistent decisions, the court concluded that "[t]his process
of ad hoc and inconsistent judgments-in which the only determinative element seems to be
the composition of the NLRB panel which happens to hear the case-has descended in the
initial case almost to the point of absurdity." Seafarers, Local 777 v. NLRB, 99 L.R.R.M. at
2907.
37. Generally, courts will show deference to the Board's decisions because of the Board's
expertise in the labor field. E.g., NLRB v. Circle Bindery, Inc., 536 F.2d 447, 452-53 (1st Cir.
1976); Frattaroli v. NLRB, 526 F.2d 1189, 1193 (1st Cir. 1975); Blue Cab Co. v. NLRB, 373
F.2d 661, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967). In certain situations, how-
ever, courts have refused to defer to the Board's judgment. See, e.g., NLRB v. Brown, 380
U.S. 278 (1965); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). The court in Seafar-
ers, Local 777, in addition to pointing to the Board's inconsistent decisions, based its refusal to
defer on the fact that the decision required the application of a common law test, at which the
courts rather than the Board are expert. 99 L. R. R. M. at 2909. Although this is a correct expres-
sion of a general rule of administrative procedure, see K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TEXT
§ 30.01 (3d ed. 1972), it ignores the Supreme Court's contrary holding in NLRB v. United
Insurance Co., 390 U.S. 254 (1968). That case involved a Board decision finding that debit
agents who performed certain functions for an insurance company were, under the common law
test, employees. The court enforced the Board's decision, holding that even though the decision
involved the application of agency law, which is clearly out of the Board's area of administrative
expertise, the decision should stand as long as it reflects a choice "between two fairly conflicting
views." Id. at 260.
The Board's decision in Yellow Cab Co. (Seafarers, Local 777) clearly meets the criteria
established by the Supreme Court in United Insurance. Both the ALJ and the Board considered
strong evidence supporting either finding, clearly making the Board's decision a choice "be-
tween two fairly conflicting views." Id. Yet, the court in Seafarers, Local 777 refused to follow
the dictates of United Insurance. Courts have, for the most part, followed United Insurance and
accepted the Board's findings as to the status of a worker. E.g., Aetna Freight Lines, Inc. v.
NLRB, 526 F.2d 930 (6th Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Sachs, 503 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir. 1974); NLRB v.
Deaton, 502 F.2d 1221 (5th Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Cement Transp., Inc., 490 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir.
1973); NLRB v. Pony Trucking, Inc., 486 F.2d 1039 (6th Cir. 1973); Ace Doran Hauling and
Rigging Co. v. NLRB, 462 F.2d 190 (6th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Brush-Moore Newspapers, 413
F.2d 809 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1002 (1970). On the other hand, some courts,
particularly the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, have flagrantly ignored the United Insurance
holding and repeatedly reversed Board decisions concerning the status of workers. NLRB v.
Merchants Home Delivery Service, 580 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Transcontinental
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were independent contractors, the court pointed to cases with identical facts
in which the Board came to the opposite conclusion. 38 Although the court
recognized that a somewhat irregular precedent might be expected because
of the extreme importance of the factual setting of each case, the court ob-
served that the Board had surpassed itself in "clouding what need not have
been an unusually confusing development of the law." 3 9
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE
EMPLOYEE-INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR DISTINCTION
The Board's inconsistent decisions reflect the uncertainty that has charac-
terized the employee-independent contractor distinction from the inception
of the Act. Originally, the Act applied only to employees but had no explicit
language excluding independent contractors. 40 Although the Board and the
courts operated under the assumption that the term "employee" excluded an
independent contractor, 41 employee status was readily conferred. The Board
defined an employee in light of the purposes of the Act and the economic
realities of the particular situation. 42 The Act was designed to enhance the
Theaters, Inc., 568 F.2d 132 (9th Cir. 1978); Associated Gen. Contractors v. NLRB, 564 F.2d 279
(9th Cir. 1977); Lorenz Schneider Co. v. NLRB, 517 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1975); SIDA of Hawaii,
Inc. v. NLRB, 512 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1975); Brown v. NLRB, 462 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1972);
Meyer Dairy, Inc. v. NLRB, 429 F.2d 627 (10th Cir. 1970); Carnation Co. v. NLRB, 429 F.2d
1134 (9th Cir. 1970).
Until Seafarers, Local 777, the District of Columbia Circuit followed United Insurance and
accepted the Board's decisions concerning the employee-independent contractor distinction.
Midwest Regional Joint Bd. v. NLRB, 564 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Local 814, IBT (Santini
Bros.) v. NLRB, 546 F.2d 989 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Joint Council of Teamsters, Local No. 42 v.
NLRB, 450 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
38. What greatly disturbed the court was the Board's decisions in Columbus Green Cabs I,
214 N.L.R.B. 751 (1974) and Columbus Green Cabs II, 237 N.L.R.B. No. 176, 99 L.R.R.M.
1181, [1978] 4 LAB. L. REP. (85 Lab. Cas.) 15,014 (1978).
In Columbus Green Cabs 1, reviewing an election hearing, the Board held that taxi lessees
were independent contractors and therefore outside of the bargaining unit the union sought to
represent. 214 N.L.R.B. 751, 752-53 (1974). In Columbus Green Cabs 11, reviewing a hearing
considering another election petition filed by the same union trying to represent the same
drivers of the same cab company, the Board found that because of an expansive record showing
changes in the relationship between the lessee drivers and the cab companies, the drivers were
now employees. 237 N.L.R.B. No. 176, 99 L.R.R.M. 1181, 1184. [1978] 4 LAB. L. REP. (85
Lab. Cas.) 15,014 (1978).
39. 99 L.R.R.M. at 2907.
40. Wagner Act eh, 372, § 2(3), 49 Stat. 450 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976)).
41. E.g., Philadelphia Record Co., 69 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1946) (house-to-house newsboys held
independent contractors could not be included in bargaining unit); Theurer Wagon Works, Inc.,
18 N.L.R.B. 837, 869-70 (1939) (employer not guilty of unfair labor practice because worker, a
pictorial and lettering worker in auto-body shop, was an independent contractor); Crosset
Lumber Co., 8 N.L.R.B. 440, 475-76 (1938) (lumber haulers could not unionize because they
were independent contractors).
42. E.g., Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 9 N.L.R.B. 1262 (1938). In holding that motor route
drivers were employees of the newspaper company that hired them to deliver papers, the Board
observed that
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organizing and bargaining power of workers, in hopes that the creation of
viable unions would result in labor disputes being settled by collective bar-
gaining rather than by strikes and violence.4 3 Thus, under this economic
reality test applied by the Board, whenever certain workers were in need of
the protections of the Act to organize or participate in collective bargaining
to achieve industrial peace, those workers would be designated as
employees. a
The economic reality test was adopted by the Supreme Court in NLRB v.
Hearst Publications, Inc. 45 This case involved an attempt to organize
newsboys 46 who distributed the company's newspapers. The Board applied
the economic reality test and found the newsboys to be employees. 47 The
Ninth Circuit applied the common law test, fbeusing on whether the em-
ployer has the right to control the worker in the performance of his or her work.
and found the newsboys to be independent contractors. 48 The Supreme
Court, however, agreed with the Board. The Court observed that the term
"'employee ... must be understood with reference to the Act and the facts
involved in the economic relationship." 4 9 The economic reality test was
adopted and the employee-independent contractor distinction was declared a
matter within the scope of the Board's special expertise. o
the statutory definition of the word employee [sic] is of wide scope .... The
primary consideration is whether the effectuation of the declared policy and purpose
of the Act comprehends securing to the individual the rights guaranteed and protec-
tion afforded by the Act. . . . Public interest in the administration of the Act per-
mits an inquiry into the material facts and substance of the relationship.
Id. at 1274-75.
43. Section 1 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). See generally J. ROSENFARB, THE
NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 23-35 (1940).
44. See Adelstein and Edwards, The Resurrection of NLRB v. Hearst: Independent Contrac-
tors Under the NLRA, 17 U. KANSAS L. REV. 191, 192 (1969) [hereinafter referred to as Adel-
stein and Edwards].
45. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
46. As the Court noted, the term "newsboys" is somewhat deceptive. The term refers to the
entire class of vendors engaged in the business of selling newspapers. The class was divided into
two groups: "bootjackers," and "fixed-spot" vendors. Bootjackers, mostly juveniles, worked on a
temporary or casual basis, while fixed-spot vendors, predominantly adults who relied on their
vending to support families, worked full-time. Since these vendors were more in need of re-
sponsible bargaining than the former, under the economic reality test, these vendors were more
likely to be given employee status than the bootjackers. Id. at 116.
47. Hearst Publications, Inc., 28 N.L.R.B. 1006, 1022-23 (1941).
48. Hearst Publications, Inc. v. NLRB, 136 F.2d 608, 612-14 (9th Cir. 1943).
49. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 129 (1944).
50. Id. at 130. For matters that strictly involve labor relations and determinations designed
to achieve the policies of the Act, the Board is considered expert. Consequently, reviewing
courts are instructed to afford a certain amount of deference to Board decisions relating to such
matters. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951). See GORMAN, supra note
9, at 13.
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The Congressional reaction to Hearst was less than approving. With pas-
sage of the Taft-Hartley Amendments to the Act in 1947, Congress explicitly
excluded the independent contractor from the Act's coverage. 51 The legis-
lative history clearly shows that this explicit exclusion was meant to correct
the Board's previous actions together with the Supreme Court's approval. 52
Indeed, the Senate reports criticized the Board's expansive definition of
"employee" and indicated that the definition contemplated by Congress in
passing the Act was based on the common law right of control test.5 3
The Right of Control Test
The common law right of control test arose as a means of determining the
status of a worker for purposes of respondeat superior 54 tort liability of
employers. A worker would be designated an employee if the employer
exercised a sufficient amount of control over the manner and means of the
work, as opposed to merely dictating the result of the work, to justify that
employer being held liable for an injury caused by the worker.55
The test looks to various factual indicia of either the employer's control or
the worker's independence. 56 Since many types of service relationships in-
volve conflicting amounts of control and independence, the distinction be-
51. Labor-Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
52. H.R. REP. No. 245 on H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1947), reprinted in LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 309 (1974) [hereinaf-
ter referred to as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRA].
53. S. CON. REP. ON H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 93 CONG. REC. 6441-42 (1947).
54. Under the principle of respondeat superior, an employer is vicariously liable for torts
committed by his employees. However, the employer is not liable if the hired tortfeasor is an
independent contractor rather than an employee. Although this is the general rule, the RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 410-29 (1965) lists twenty-four exceptions. W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 468 (4th ed. 1971).
55. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 468 (4th ed. 1971).
56. The RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY lists ten factors generally relevant to the status of a
worker:
1) The extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the
details of the work;
2) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business;
3) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is
usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervi-
sion;
4) the skill required in the particular occupation;
5) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and
the place of work for the person doing the work;
6) the length of time for which the person is employed;
7) the method of payment, whether by time or by the job;
8) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer;
9) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and
servant; and
10) whether or not the principal is or is not in business.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958).
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tween an employee and an independent contractor often seems arbitrary. An
examination of the case law reveals that courts have often settled close cases
on the basis of who was more capable of bearing the injured party's loss. If
the wrongdoer was more capable, he or she would be deemed an indepen-
dent contractor, but if the deeper pocket belonged to the party who hired
the wrongdoer, an employment relationship would be found.
5 7
Since the purpose of the Act is obviously unrelated to tort liability, such
loss bearing considerations are not examined by the Board in applying the
right of control test. The legislative comments to the Taft-Hartley Amend-
ments clarify that a worker's status under the Act is to be determined strictly
by the right of control test, with no indication of how much or what type of
control creates an employment relationship. 58 With no apparent legislative
purpose to aid the Board in applying this test, and a mandate from the
courts to apply the test considering all of the circumstances, with no one
factor dispositive, 59 the Board has considered a myriad of factors in applying
the test. 60 The result, as reflected by the Board's decisions concerning the
status of taxi drivers, is that vacillation and inconsistency have characterized
the Board's decisions.
57. Adelstein and Edwards, supra note 44, at 194.
58. See notes 51, 52, and accompanying text supra.
59. In NLRB v. United Insurance Co., 390 U.S. 254 (1968), see note 37 supra the Su-
preme Court observed that
[i]n such a situation as this, there is no shorthand formula or magic phrase that can
be applied to find the answer, but all of the incidents of the relationship must be
assessed and weighed with no one factor being decisive. What is important is that
the total factual context is assessed in light of the pertinent common law agency
principles.
Id. at 258
60. The Board has looked to factors probative of the actual supervision by the employer over
the worker, such as who supplies the instrumentalities through which the work is done, the
intent of the parties, and actual restrictions imposed on the worker by the employer. E.g.,
Boston After Dark, Inc., 210 N.L.R.B. 38 (1974) (freelance writers' and cartoonists' option of
contributing or not contributing material in any given week without prejudicing chances for
contributing material at a later date is indicative of independent contractor status); Land-O-
Lakes, Inc., 204 N.L.R.B. 519 (1973) (30-day termination of lease option is indicative of
employee status); Aetna Freight Lines, Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 740 (1971) (employer's right to ter-
minate lease for infraction of lease provision is indicative of employee status); Peerless Publica-
tions, Inc., 190 N.L.R.B. 658 (1971) (although contract stated workers were employees, intent
of parties is only one factor in determining status).
Additionally, the Board has looked for guidance to factors probative of the amount of entre-
preneurial risk undertaken by the worker. These factors include capital invested, the method of
compensation, and proprietary interest in the work. E.g., Farmers Ins. Co., 209 N.L.R.B. 1163
(1974) (insurance agents' opportunity for profits based on individual skill is indicative of inde-
pendent contractor status); New York Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. 4 (1973) (full-time faculty's not being
subject to entrepreneurial risks and profits is indicative of employee status); Lorenz Schneider
Co., Inc., 203 N.L.R.B. 217 (1973) (manufacturer's control over prices at which driver could
resell merchandise is indicative of employee status); A.S. Abell Co., Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. 144




Until 1974, the Board uniformly found taxi drivers to be employees re-
gardless of the particular arrangement between the driver and the company.
Taxi lessees, franchisees, 6 1 commission drivers, and even owner-drivers who
belonged to a self-regulatory trade association of other owners, were given
employee status.6 2  In applying the right of control test, the Board considered
The relevancy of entrepreneurial characteristics on the status of the worker is often tied to
language in the congressional history of the enactment of the independent contractor exclusion.
Although Congress made it clear that the status of a worker should be determined strictly by
measuring the employer's right to control that worker, see notes 51-53 supra, language in the
history states that:
[e]mployees work for wages or salaries under direct supervision. Independent con-
tractors undertake to do a job for a price, decide how the work will be done,
usually hire others to do the work, and depend for their income not upon wages but
upon the difference between what they pay for goods, materials, and labor, and
what they receive for the end result, that is, upon profits.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRA, supra note 52, at 18. Consequently, while Congress
calls for a strict adherence to the common law test, which relies chiefly on an examination of
employer control to determine the status of a worker, an added factor is the entrepreneurial
aspect of the work. A plausible explanation for the relevancy of entrepreneurial characteristics of
the worker is that such factors "imply control." NLRB v. Cement Transport Co., 490 F.2d 1024
(6th Cir, 1973); Ace Doran Hauling and Rigging Co. v. NLRB, 462 F.2d 190 (6th Cir. 1973).
61. Whether a driver is a taxi lessee or franchisee has, under the right of control test, little
relevancy to the status of the driver. In its simplest terms, "a franchise is a license from the
owner of a trademark or tradename permitting another to sell a product or service under that
name or mark." G. GLICKMAN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, FRANCHISING § 2.01 (1978). The
relationship between the franchisee and the franchisor is governed by the franchise agreement.
Like the lessee, the franchisee is an employee if the franchisor reserves the right to control the
manner and means of the franchisee's performance. Id. § 2.03(4) at 28. See generally, McGuire,
Labor Law Aspects of Franchising, 13 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 215 (1971).
62. SIDA of Hawaii, Inc., 191 N.L.R.B. 194 (1972), enf. denied sub norn. SIDA of Hawaii,
v. NLRB, 512 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1975) (owner-drivers employees of self-regulatory association);
Buffalo Cab Co., 189 N.L.R.B. 410 (1971) (lessees employees of taxi-leasing company even
though city required drivers to be sponsored by company); Checker Cab Ass'n, 185 N.L.R.B.
182 (1970) (franchisees employees of franchisor-cab company); Trade Wind Transp. Co., 185
N.L.R.B. 373 (1970) (owner-drivers and lessees held employees); Checker Cab Co., 180
N.L.R.B. 737 (1970) (owner-drivers employees of co-op); Yellow Cab Co., 179 N.L.R.B. 850
(1969) (lessees employees of lessor cab company); Central Taxi Service, 173 N.L.R.B. 826 (1968)
(lessees employees of lessor cab company); Transportation Promotions, Inc., 173 N.L.R.B. 828
(1968) (lessees employees of lessor cab company); Miami Beach Yellow Cab Co., 173 N.L.R.B.
831 (1968) (lessees employees of lessor cab company); Red Cab Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 1262 (1968)
(lessees employees of lessor cab company); Association of Independent Taxicab Operators, Inc.,
164 N.L.R.B. 859 (1966) (owner-drivers employees of self regulatory association); Supreme Vic-
tory and Deluxe Cab Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 140 (1966) (owner-drivers employees of company ob-
taining permits issued by city); Veteran's Cab Co. of Memphis, 159 N.L.R.B. 251 (1966) (les-
sees employees of lessor cab company); Blue Cab Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 489 (1966) (lessees em-
ployees of lessor cab company). Yellow Cab Co., Seafarers Local 10, 141 N.L.R.B. 583 (1964)
(lessees employees of lessor cab company); Mound City Yellow Cab Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 484 (1961)
(lessees employees of lessor cab company).
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the relevant factors in light of the business realities of the given situation.
Under this business realities approach, a cab company's lack of supervision
over the driver while operating the cab was not considered dispositive, since
it was comparable to an employer's lack of supervision over a truck driver's
choice of a route in delivering goods or a carpenter's choice of using a plane,
a chisel, or a saw to shave a piece of wood. 63 These choices, considered
inherent in the natu-re of the work, were characterized as routine, offering
little indication of actual employer control over the driver.
Instead of determining the status of taxi lessees solely by the employer's
control over the operation of the cab, the Board looked at the overall rela-
tionship between the company and the driver. Any facts establishing the
driver's inability to exercise independent judgment were emphasized. 64
Consequently, crucial factors have been the employer's freedom to unilater-
ally set the terms of the lease, 65 the employer's ability to discharge or dis-
cipline drivers, 66 and the employer's ability to prohibit sub-leasing. 67 Fac-
tors which point to the employer's burden of entrepreneurial risk, such as
the driver's lack of investment in the cab, and the employer being the ben-
eficiary of any goodwill arising out of the operation of the cab, have also
been determinative. 68 In effect, any facts pointing to employer control over
63. Checker Cab Ass'n, Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. 182, 184 (1970).
64. E.g., id. The Board's injection of such qualifying factors into the right of control test has
been criticized as a return to the economic reality test of Hearst. Adelstein and Edwards, supra
note 44, at 196. The criticism is focused on the Board's heavy reliance on the workers' lack of
entrepreneurial characterstics in order to find an employment relationship, see, e.g., San An-
tonio Light Co., 167 N.L.R.B. 689 (1967); El Mundo, Inc., 167 N.L.R.B. 760 (1967). This
criticism, however, is not completely accurate. The Board's examination of the overall relation-
ship, rather than of actual employer supervision over the details of the work, can be seen as a
flexible application of the right of control test. This approach, especially in industries where
direct supervision over the work is minimal, may be a more accurate measure of the employer's
actual control over the worker. For example, the Board often looks to indirect control over the
driver, such as the company's ability to discharge or discipline the driver at will. The rationale
is that while the company does not directly control the driver in his prospecting for fares, it
retains indirect control based on the driver's knowledge that he is ultimately answerable to the
company for his performance.
In this sense, the Board is not returning to the economic reality test. The workers' need for a
bargaining representative to achieve the purposes of the Act never enters into the test. What
can be validly criticized, however, is the Board's "singlemindedness" in finding an employment
relationship. Adelstein and Edwards, supra note 44, at 197. Too often the Board merely recites
the facts, reiterates the right of control test, and concludes that in the overall relationship the
workers are employees. Meaningful analysis, at least in the earlier cases, has been lacking. See,
e.g., Central Taxi Service, 173 N.L.R.B. 826 (1968); Miami Beach Yellow Cab Co., 173
N.L.R.B. 831 (1968).
65. See, e.g., Checker Cab Ass'n, 185 N.L.R.B. 182 (1970).
66. See, e.g., Checker Cab Co., 180 N.L.R.B. 738 (1969); Central Taxi Service, 173
N.L.R.B. 862 (1968).
67. See, e.g., Mound City Yellow Cab Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 484 (1961).
68. See note 60 supra.
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the driver in any aspect of the relationship were emphasized, while those
facts showing the driver's freedom of choice in operating the cab were dis-
counted.
In Greater Houston Transportation Co., 69 the Board began a retreat from
this approach, though never overruling the earlier cases or explicitly under-
mining the "nature of the business" approach. 7 In finding that taxi fran-
chisees and owner-drivers were independent contractors, the Board rejected
factors which previously were dispositive in establishing an employment re-
lationship. 7 1  This new approach, which placed more emphasis on the
driver's independence while operating the cab, was continued in Barwood,
Inc. 72 and Columbus Green Cabs I. 73 These cases involved taxi lessees
who leased on short term agreements, drove cabs carrying the company in-
signia, and were prohibited from sub-leasing. The Board, over the protests
of the dissenters who claimed that the majority was ignoring the business
realities of the situation, 74 found that these taxi lessees were independent
contractors. 75
69. 208 N.L.R.B. 1020 (1974).
70. The Board merely mentioned the facts of the case and evaluated the amount of control
exercised. No attempt was made to distinguish the prior inconsistent cases. Id.
The only explanation for the sudden shift in the Board's approach, offered by the court in
Seafarers, Local 777, was the composition of the Board members deciding the case. See note 36
supra. When Greater Houston was decided, the Board consisted of Chairman Miller and mem-
bers Kennedy, Penello, Fanning, and Jenkins. Miller and Kennedy have uniformly voted to
find taxi lessees independent contractors. On the other hand, members Fanning and Jenkins
have uniformly found such drivers employees. The swing vote was member Penello's, who was
appointed to the Board by President Nixon in 1974.
71. The Board rejected such facts as the company's freedom to unilaterally set the terms of
the franchise agreement, that the agreement required compliance with all government regula-
tions, that the cabs had to be kept in good repair, that the franchisees had to refrain from
behavior detrimental to the franchisor's public image, and that the company had the right to
terminate the agreement at any time for an infraction of a provision of the agreement. Greater
Houston Transp. Co., 208 N.L.R.B. 1020, 1024 (1974).
72. 209 N.L.R.B. 19 (1974), deciding by a panel of members consisting of Fanning, Ken-
nedy, and Penello; Fanning dissenting.
73. 214 N.L.R.B. 751 (1974), decided by a panel of members consisting of Fanning, Ken-
nedy, and Penello; Fanning dissenting.
74. Columbus Green Cabs I, 214 N.L.R.B. 751, 753 (1974). The business realities that
member Fanning referred to in his dissenting opinion all pointed to the cab company's indirect
control over the lessee drivers. These indirect controls included: the company prohibited les-
sees from sub-leasing; the company required compliance with extensive city and state regula-
tion; the company could refuse to renew a lease at will or terminate an existing lease for certain
violations. Fanning also pointed to the fact that since the lessee-drivers drove uniform cabs all
bearing the company's insignia, the public got the impression that all drivers were employed by
the company. Consequently, any goodwill arising from the taxi operation is to the company's
benefit. Id.
75. Barwood, Inc., 209 N.L.R.B. 19, 23 (1974); Columbus Green Cabs I, 214 N.L.R.B. 751,
753 (1974).
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Yellow Cab Co. (Seafarers, Local 777)7 6 marks the Board's return to the
original approach. 77 The Board examined factors that clearly revealed the
inherent nature of the taxi business. These factors included the company's
right to extend a lease at its discretion or terminate a lease at any time for
accidents or sub-leasing, and the pervasive city regulations which held the
company accountable if the driver failed to comply. 78 Emphasizing these
factors and expressing a need to narrowly construe the earlier inconsistent
cases, the Board held that the taxi lessees in question were employees. The
D.C. Circuit, disturbed by the Board's vacillation, felt warranted in sub-
stituting its own analysis for that of the Board. 79
THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
The court's application of the right of control test in Seafarers, Local 777
indicated that it disagreed with the Board's practice of applying the test in
light of the nature of the work. The court made two observations concerning
the relevant controls involved in determining the status of taxi lessees which
clearly reject the Board's approach. 80
76. 229 N.L.R.B. 1329 (1977).
77. Again the only explanation for the Board's switch is the composition of the Board mem-
bers deciding the case. See note 70 supra. Yellow Cab Co., (Seafarers, Local 777), was decided
by members Fanning, Jenkins, Penello, and Murphy. Penello dissented. Yellow Cab Co., 229
N.L.R.B. at 1336. Member Murphy, appointed to the Board by President Ford on February
18, 1975, has in this and subsequent cases uniformly voted to find taxi lessees employees. City
Cab Co. of Orlando, 242 N.L.R.B. No. 16, [1979] 2 LAB. REL. REP. (101 L.R.R.M.) 1114;
[1979] 5 LAB. L. REP. 15,825 (1979). Columbus Green Cabs II, 237 N.L.R.B. No. 176, 99
L.R.R.M. 1181, [1978] 4 LAB. L. REP. (85 Lab. Cas.) 15,014 (1978); City Cab Co., 232
N.L.R.B. 105 (1977).
78. The effect of the regulations was a major factor. See note 30 supra. Other factors the
Board noted include:
1) the lessee drivers had no investment in the instrumentalities of their work;
2) the lessee cabs displayed the companies' insignia and all goodwill arising out of
the operation of the cabs inured to the companies' benefit;
3) the work performed by the lessee drivers was an essential part of the companies'
normal operation;
4) the terms of the lease were unilaterally set by the companies;
5) lessee drivers were subject to reference checks in the manner of regular
employees at the time of application for a lease;
6) the companies imposed a 250-mile limitation on miles driven during the term of
the lease;
7) the companies imposed dress restrictions on lessee drivers;
8) the companies at least arguably provided Workmen's Compensation insurance for
the lessee drivers (In Morgan Cab Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 60 I11. 2d 92, 324 N.E.2d
425 (1975) and Penny Cab Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 60 II. 2d 217, 326 N.E.2d 393
(1975), the Illinois Supreme Court held that, under the right of control test, the taxi
lessees in question were employees for purposes of the Illinois Workmen's Com-
pensation laws.)
Yellow Cab Co., 229 N.L.R.B. at 1332.
79. Seafarer's, Local 777, 99 L.L.R.M. 2903, 84 Lab. Cas. 10,865 (D.C. 1978).
80. 99 L.R.R.M. at 2910-140.
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The first observation was that in a correct application of the right of con-
trol test, the relevant controls to consider are those exerted by the cab com-
pany over the lessee driver while the driver is operating the cab. 81 The
court followed Party Cab Co. v. United States,8 2 a Seventh Circuit decision in
which the court applied the right of control test to determine that taxi lessees
were independent contractors for purposes of the employment tax stat-
utes.8 3  In following Party Cab Co., the court failed to consider that the
unique nature of the business affords a taxi driver, under any arrangement, a
certain amount of freedom to prospect for fares with only minimal employer
interference.
Under the Board's approach, this freedom was considered "inherent in the
nature of the work" rather than indicative of independent contractor
status. 84 The Board instead chose to consider facts establishing that the
company exerted control over the driver in the overall relationship. 85 Con-
sequently, the Board was convinced that the lessee drivers were employees,
pointing to such facts as the company's ability to unilaterally set the terms of
the lease and to discharge or discipline the lessee drivers. 8 6  The court,
following Party Cab Co., dismissed these facts as only marginally rele-
vant.8 7  The court instead focused on facts indicating the company's
81. Id. at 2910.
82. 172 F.2d 87 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 818 (1949).
83. The status of a worker under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301 et. seq. (1976),
and the withholding provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, I.R.C. §§ 3401-3506, are
often considered illuminating in determining the status of a worker under the National Labor
Relations Act. See Oklahoma Trailor Convoy, Inc., 99 N.L.R.B. 1019 (1952); Inland Steel Co.,
77 N.L.R.B. 1 (1948). The development of the distinction under the employment tax acts and
the National Labor Relations Act is almost parallel. After passage of the Social Security Act in
1935, the courts began to apply an economic reality test which defined employee in relation to
the purposes of the statute. See, e.g., Bartles v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126 (1947); United
States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947). The Congressional reaction was almost identical to the
reaction to Hearst. See notes 50-53 and accompanying text supra. In passing the Gearhart
Resolution, H.R. J. REs. 296, Pub. L. No. 80-642, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1948), Congress pro-
claimed that the correct test for distinguishing between an employee and an independent con-
tractor under the employment tax acts is the right of control test. See generally Smith,
Employee or Independent Contractor, 33 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAx 577 (1975).
Although Party Cab Co. is relevant, the court cited it and adopted its reasoning without
considering Mitchell v. Gibbons, 172 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1949). In Mitchell, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals refused to adhere to Party Cab Co. and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction an
anti-trust suit brought against a union attempting to organize the plaintiff's lessee taxi drivers.
See note 8 supra.
84. Yellow Cab Co., 229 N.L.R.B. at 1333.
85. The Board reasoned that although the companies exert little control over the actual
operation of the cab, they exert control over other aspects of the relationship between the
company and the driver. These controls, while not constituting direct supervision over the
driver while he operates the cab, indirectly influence the driver's behavior, since the driver is
in danger of having his lease terminated for certain activities. Id. at 1332.
86. Id.
87. 99 L.R.R.M. at 2911.
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inability to control the "physical movements" of the driver while in posses-
sion of the cab. 88
The second observation made by the court in applying the right of control
test was that company controls exercised pursuant to city regulations are
irrelevant to the determination of whether the employer exerted sufficient
control to create employee status.8 9 The court defined an employee as one
who surrenders control to the employer. The court, however, viewed the city-
imposed controls as requiring the driver to surrender control to the city
rather than to the cab company. 90
Under the Board's approach, the fact that Chicago, like most major
cities, 91 extensively regulates its taxicab industry was taken into account.
The Board recognized that city regulations impose restrictions on the driver
which, under normal conditions, would be imposed by the employer. 92
Consequently, no distinction was made between controls exercised by the
company on its own initiative and those the company imposed pursuant to
city regulations. The court, however, rejected this reasoning and concluded
that "[glovernment regulations constitute supervision not by the employer
but by the state." 93
This distinction between city imposed controls and employer imposed
controls is inconsistent with the court's interpretation of the right of control
test. By rejecting the Board's interjection of business realities into the test
and looking only to those employer controls exerted over the driver while in
possession of the cab, the court was striving for a strict application of the
common law test, which examiner's the employer's control over the manner
and means of the work. The court's interpretation was that only control over
the driver's operation of the cab was relevant. The court strays, however,
from this restrictive approach by considering the company's reason for exer-
cising control. For tort purposes, the original concern of the common law
test, the employer's control over the worker would determine liability re-
88. Id.
89. Id. at 2911-12.
90. Id. at 2912.
91. Verkuil, supra note 30, at 672.
92. Yellow Cab Co., 229 N.L.R.B. at 1331. The ALJ observed that "the regulations ...
cover numerous aspects of the drivers' work which, in a different context, might normally be
dealt with by the employer." Id. at 1340.
93. 99 L.R.R.M. at 2912. The court cited Local 814, IBT (Santini Bros.), 223 N.L.R.B. 752
(1975), enforced, 546 F.2d 989 (D.C. Cir. 1975), as support for the proposition that company
controls must substantially exceed those required by governmental regulation for an employ-
ment relationship to exist. In Santini Bros., the Board found that tractor owner-operators who
hauled cargo for a New York moving and storage company were independent contractors. The
Board distinguished Santini Bros. from an earlier case, Molloy Bros., 208 N.L.R.B. 276 (1974),
in which owner-operators who hauled for another New York moving and storage company were
held to be employees. One factor which the Board used to distinguish the two cases was that in
MoUoy Bros. the company controls substantially exceeded the government regulations, while in
Santini Bros., they did not. See 41 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 62-63 (1976).
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gardless of whether the employer exercised such control by his or her own
initiative or pursuant to government regulations. 94
A major problem with the court's application of the right of control test is
that it greatly restricts the scope of relevant controls to be considered in
making the employee-independent contractor distinction. The decision looks
only to controls over the driver while he or she operates the cab, ignoring
the fact that in the taxi industry such controls are minimal. Furthermore,
the decision discounts controls which are dictated by government regulations
without realizing that almost all control in the taxi industry emanates from
this source. 95 By virtually dismissing all employer controls as irrelevant,
the decision would seem to suggest that all taxi drivers, whether driving on
a lease or a commission basis, are independent contractors.
The court avoided this conclusion by stating that the method of compensa-
tion, the only significant change resulting from the leasing program was the
dispositive factor in determining the independent contractor status of the
lessee drivers. 96 The company received a flat rental fee from the driver
before the driver took possession of the cab. Thus, the company was fully
compensated before the driver even took the cab out of the company garage.
The court reasoned that this eliminated any financial incentive for the com-
pany to exercise control over the driver. The court found that this lack of
financial incentive created a strong inference that the cab company did not
exert control over the driver's performance while operating the cab. 97
This reasoning creates a dual standard for application of the right of con-
trol test. In relation to commission drivers, the court would accept the
Board's approach. The controls exerted by the employer in the overall rela-
tionship would be considered relevant because of the employer's financial
incentive to exercise such controls. These same controls applied to lessee
drivers, however, would be rejected in favor of those facts establishing the
employer's actual control over the lessee driver's operation of the cab. 98
94. NLRB v. Deaton, Inc., 502 F.2d 1221, 1226 (5th Cir. 1974); John Himmer Transfer
Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 284, 286 (1975); Dixie Transp. Co., 218 N.L.R.B. 1243, 1244 (1975). Contra:
SIDA of Hawaii v. NLRB, 512 F.2d 354, 359 (9th Cir. 1975); Portage Transfer Co., 204
N.L.R.B. 787, 788 (1973).
95. See Verkuil, supra note 30, at 672.
96. 99 L.R.R.M. at 2916.
97. Id. The court also observed that the company's being compensated by a flat rental fee
eliminated the need for lessee drivers to keep trip sheets. See note 23 supra. The court noted
that trip sheets, reflecting the driver's performance while operating the cab, was the primary
means by which the company controlled the drivers. Consequently, the leasing program,
eliminating trip sheets, resulted in a significant relinquishment of control over the drivers. The
court discounted a regulation passed by the Chicago Consumer Commissioner after the initial
hearing which required the cab companies to keep records of fares collected by each driver.
The ALJ discounted this fact with skepticism, observing that "the union has some degree of
clout at City Hall, and has not hesitated to use it." Yellow Cab Co., 229 N.L.R.B. at 1347. The
court less candidly discounted this fact by treating it as a city-imposed regulation rather than a
company-imposed control. 99 L.R.R.M. at 2913.
98. This reasoning ignores the effect of goodwill as a financial incentive for control under the
leasing program. The Board, in considering the nature of the business, has often pointed to the
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In light of the court's aspiration for a strict application of the right of
control test, this distinction is at best artificial. An equal amount of control
could be exerted over both lessee and commission drivers. Each type of
driver is engaged in the same work. Yet, this dual standard for applying the
right of control test treats the same controls differently based on how the
driver chooses to be compensated for driving the cab.
IMPACT OF THE DECISION
At the time of the decision, 80% of all Yellow and Checker drivers in
Chicago leased cabs. 99 The court's finding that the lessees are independent
contractors precluded these drivers from union representation. 100 With
union members now affecting only 20% of the companies' business, the deci-
sion significantly diminished, if not destroyed, the union's bargaining
power. 101
fact that lessee drivers operate cabs bearing the insignia and design of the company as indicative
of employee status. Thus the company is the beneficiary of all goodwill arising out of the opera-
tion of the cab. The company's need to maintain a positive public image in order to preserve
the value of its business acts as a strong incentive for the assertion of control over its drivers.
99. Chicago Tribune, Oct. 25, 1978, at 3, col. 4.
100. See note 4 supra.
101. See Brief for the union as intervenor at 3, Local 777, DUOC, Seafarers v. NLRB, 99
L.R.R.M. 2902, 84 Lab. Cas. 10,865 (1978).
The Board held that the significant reduction in the union's membership affected the union
drivers' "terms and conditions" of employment. Therefore, the leasing program was a mandatory
subject of bargaining. See notes 34 and 35 supra. Consequently, the Board held that even if the
lessee drivers were independent contractors, the companies violated § 8(a)(5) of the Act by
unilaterally implementing the leasing program without first bargaining with the union. See note
34 supra.
The court refused to accept the Board's holding. Pointing to language in the ALJ's decision,
indicating that the union demanded to be recognized as bargaining agent for the-lessee drivers,
the court held that it was the union who refused to bargain rather than the companies. 99
L.R.R.M. at 2420-22. This finding, of course, rendered irrelevant the issue of whether the
decision to begin leasing cabs was a mandatory subject of bargaining.
Before reaching this conclusion, however, the court announced that if necessary it would hold
that the leasing program was not a mandatory subject of bargaining. Id. The court distinguished
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 203, see note 34 supra, which the Board
cited to support its finding. Yellow Cab Co., 229 N.L.R.B. at 1134. Fibreboard dealt with an
employer that decided to subcontract its maintenance work to independent contractors rather
than have its own employees perform that work. The Court held that the company violated
§ 8(a)(5) by refusing to bargain with the union representing the employer's maintenance crew over
the decision to subcontract. The court found that when an employer's decision affects the terms
and conditions of employment of the employees in question, as opposed to affecting the funda-
mental nature of the business, it is a mandatory subject of bargaining. 379 U.S. at 213. See
Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 1148 (1966).
The court in Seafarers, Local 777 distinguished Fibreboard as dealing with an employer who
"essentially only replaced more expensive union labor with more economical outside workers."
99 L.R.R.M. at 2919. The court distinguished the present case, finding that for "Yellow and
Checker, on the other hand, the companies began leasing significantly to alter what had become
a low profit operation."Id.
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The decision's effect may not be limited to Local 777 of the Seafarers
Union. Leasing is an increasingly popular method of operation in the taxi
industry. 102 The wide-spread effect of the decision could be to transform
leasing into an extremely effective and attractive union-busting device. 10 3
Due to the court's rationale for finding taxi lessees independent contractors,
this device is available to employers in any extensively regulated indus-
try. 104 The court discounted employer controls that were required by gov-
ernmental regulations. 105 In industries where employer controls are dic-
tated by or coincide with extensive governmental regulation, an employer
can implement a leasing program while losing little if any control over the
workers. An employer's control over the workers will be attributed to the
regulations; consequently, it will be insufficient to establish any employ-
ment relationship. The attractiveness of this scheme is evident. The
employer frees himself or herself from having to deal with a union, giving
the employer unilateral control over the relationship with the worker. Yet,
the employer's intangible interest in the business is protected by the perva-
sive government regulations. 10 6
Among the regulated businesses which are particularly susceptible to this
type of union-busting tactic is the trucking industry. Analogies between taxi
leasing and truck leasing '0 7 can be easily drawn. Both businesses by nature
102. Brief of Amicus Curiae International Taxicab Association at 1, Local 777, DUOC, Sea-
farers v. NLRB, 99 L.R.R.M. 2903, 84 Lab. Cas. 10,865 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
103. Of course the Board is not compelled to follow precedent rendered by Circuit Courts of
Appeal reviewing Board decisions. Consequently, the Board can refuse to follow the court's
decision in Seafarers, Local 777. Given the Board's expansive view of employees status of les-
sees, see note 77 supra, the decision is not likely to be followed in the near future. See City
Cab Co. of Orlando, 242 N.L.R.B. No. 16, [1979] 2 LAB. REL. REP. (101 L.R.R.M.) 1114,
[1979] 5 LAB. L. REP. 15,825 (1979). This, of course, would thwart the effect of such union-
busting tactics. However, under § 10(f) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1976), a party can get
judicial review of a Board decision in any circuit in which it does business, in the circuit where
the unfair labor practice occurred, or in the District of Columbia Circuit. As a result, even if
the Board finds workers an employer hires on a leasing basis to be employees, the employer
can, based on Seafarers, Local 777, get supportive judicial review from the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals.
104. See, e.g., notes 107-09 infra.
105. 99 L.R.R.M. at 2911-12. See notes 88, and 89, and accompanying text supra.
106. Because of the extensive city regulation, a cab company in Chicago has as much protec-
tion of its goodwill under a leasing program as it does under a commission program. For exam-
ple, under Chicago regulations, a driver must present a neat appearance and keep his cab clean.
He must report lost articles, operate the meter correctly and charge a certain fare. He or she
cannot give misinformation to customers, take customers to wrong destinations, solicit, loiter, or
gamble near the cab. The driver cannot refuse service to a customer, act rudely to passengers
or drive carelessly. The driver is also required to keep the cab in operation while in possession.
In essence, the regulations impose strict controls-on the driver which insure, to an extent, that
the goodwill of the company will be maintained. Yellow Cab co., 229 N.L.R.B. at 1340. See note 30
supra.
107. The most common type of leasing arrangement in the trucking industry involves
owner-operators of trucks and for-hire or private carriers. A for-hire carrier is a trucking com-
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involve little employer control over the physical movements of the driver.
Like the cab company, many trucking outfits have little opportunity to
supervise the driver's actual performance of the work. A truck driver is gen-
erally given an assignment to pick-up or deliver cartage. The employer's
supervision extends only to these results. Moreover, like the taxi indus-
try, 10 8  the trucking industry is extensively regulated. 10 9  Con-
sequently, whatever control the employer exerts over the driver is likely to
coincide with regulations required by the government. Under the rationale
of Seafarers, Local 777, such control will be irrelevant to the determination
of the driver's status.
In addition to creating a union-busting tactic for employers who can feasi-
bly institute leasing programs, the decision threatens to disrupt many firmly
established driver unions. 110 These unions, comprised of lessee drivers in
the trucking and taxi industries, are jeopardized by the court's emphasis on the
method of compensation as the dispositive factor in determining the inde-
pendent contractor status of lessee drivers. "I Since the method of com-
pensation used by the cab companies in Seafarers, Local 777, where a fixed
rental fee is paid by the lessee driver, is characteristic of most leasing
schemes, 112 the court's decision can easily be interpreted as holding that
lessee drivers in effect are independent contractors per se.
CONCLUSION
If the Supreme Court upholds Seafarers, Local 777, 113 taxi leasing may
become a standard method of destroying taxi driver unions throughout the
pany which provides transportation of freight owned by another party. A private carrier ships its
own goods. Under the arrangement, the owner-operator will lease the truck to the carrier while
agreeing to drive the truck himself. The arrangements usually cover one haul, known as a 'trip
haul," but often are for longer periods. C. TAFF, COMMERCIAL MOTOR TRANSPORTATION
315-37 (4th ed. 1969). It is estimated that at least 800,000 of all trucks used in hauling freight
are leased. Brewe, Liability Insurance Coverage of Leased Trucks, 8 TRANSP. L.J. 107, 108
(1976). In the Midwest, 59.3% of all trucks used by carriers are leased on some type of ar-
rangement. AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATION, INC., AMERICAN TRUCKING TRENDS 31 (1976).
108. Taxi businesses are generally regulated by city and state law. See Verkuil, supra note
30, at 672.
109. The trucking industry is extensively regulated by the Interstate Commerce Commission
and the Department of Transportation, as well as various state and local agencies. Generally,
the ICC regulates such standards as rates, routes, types of service, and types of commodities
transported. The Department of Transportation is charged with overseeing safety, equipment
standards, and hours of service. AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATION, INC. AMERICAN TRUCKING
TRENDS 36 (1976).
110. See Fanning's dissent in Columbus Green Cabs, 214 N.L.R.B. 751, 753 (1974).
111. Brief for the National Labor Relations Board, at 11, Local 777, DUOC, Seafarers v.
NLRB, 99 L.R.R.M. 2903, 84 Lab. Cas. $ 10,865 (1978).
112. Id.
113. As of this writing, a petition for certiorari had not been filed.
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country. By identifying the fixed rental method of compensation as the dis-
positive 'factor, the court in effect has held that taxi lessees are independent
contractors per se, since this method of compensation is characteristic of
most leasing schemes. By discounting employer controls that are dictated by
the government, the decision threatens unions in other extensively regulated
industries where leasing programs can easily be implemented. 114 Con-
sequently, by applying a restrictive version of the right of control test which
discounts many employer controls, the court has developed an effective
method for employers to retain significant control over workers while deny-
ing those workers protections granted under the Act.
Seafarers, Local 777 can easily be criticized as promulgating an overly
restrictive test for determining the status of a worker. The ultimate criticism,
however, must be directed at the Board. The Board has made an already
nebulous area more uncertain by wavering between a strict test, emphasiz-
ing the employer's control over the physical conduct of the driver, and a
flexible approach, considering employer control in the overall relationship.
This vacillation has created confusion among both administrative law judges
and employers as to whether there is a duty to bargain with a union claiming
to represent workers the employer hires on a lease basis. 115 Moreover,
where the Board has consistently applied a business realities approach, 116 it
has often done so in a perfunctory and cursory manner. 117 The result is
that even the Board's consistent decisions have little credibility among re-
viewing courts. 118 What is needed is both a consistent and accurate appli-
cation of the right of control test to define employee under the Act. Even
the Board's business realities approach, prudently applied, 119 would suffice.
However, if there is any progress to be made in arriving at a meaningful
definition of employee under the Act, it must begin with the Board.
Thomas DiCianni
114. See note 107 and accompanying text supra.
115. 99 L.R.R.M. at 2908. The court pointed out that Yellow and Checker, in designing their
leasing operation, consulted with other cab companies whose lessee drivers had been held by
the Board to be independent contractors.
116. See notes 62-68 and accompanying text supra.
117. For example, in SIDA of Hawaii, 191 N.L.R.B. 194 (1971), enf. denied, SIDA of
Hawaii, Inc. v. NLRB, 512 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1975), the Board, finding that owner-drivers
were employees of a self-regulatory incorporated association, merely mentioned the facts sup-
porting both findings and concluded that under all the circumstances, the owner-drivers were
employees. An in-depth business realities analysis should have carefully considered the drivers'
independence in light of such facts as the drivers having substantial investment in their cabs,
the owner-drivers' being free to lease or hire other drivers to drive their cabs, and the owner-
drivers being free to work or not work when they pleased.
118. See, e.g., Brown v. NLRB, 462 F.2d 699, 702 (9th Cir. 1972); Carnation Co. v. NLRB,
429 F.2d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 1970).
119. See note 117 supra.
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